Hostility to Religion, American Style by Gaffney, Edward McGlynn, Jr.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 Fall 1992: Symposium - Confronting the 
Wall of Separation: A New Dialogue Between 
Law and Religion on the Meaning of the First 
Amendment 
Article 21 
Hostility to Religion, American Style 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Edward M. Gaffney Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 263 (1992) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol42/iss1/21 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
HOSTILITY TO RELIGION, AMERICAN STYLE
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
On Christmas day in 1830, Stephen Girard signed a will making
various bequests to relatives and friends, to the City of New Orle-
ans, and to various charities.' A decade or so later, this will became
famous when a greedy relative turned a posthumous family squab-
ble into a Supreme Court controversy. John Girard, one of Ste-
phen's heirs, sought to invalidate a provision in the will that had
established a trust to operate a college for poor white orphans to be
administered by the city of Philadelphia.2
Nowadays, a clever lawyer seeking to enhance his client's portion
of the estate might attack the racial discrimination in the provision
selecting the beneficiaries.' Since the dispute arose before the enact-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the attack focused on
whether the arrangements of Stephen Girard's will were invalid be-
cause they implicated the government in an educational endeavor
that was antithetical or hostile to the Christian religion by excluding
clerics from the faculty and administration of the college.'
* Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. This Essay is based on
remarks given at a conference sponsored by the Center for Church/State Studies, DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law in Chicago on December 6 and 7, 1991, and on a statement that I prepared
for interfaith dialogue between Muslims and Roman Catholics in Los Angeles. I am grateful to
Kimberlee Colby, Daniel Conkle, Thomas Curry, Laura Gaston Dooley, John Garvey, Frederick
Gedicks, Mary Ann Glendon, James Gordon III, David Gregory, Os Guinness, Emily Fowler
Hartigan, Dean Kelley, Douglas Laycock, Nathan Lewin, Michael W. McConnell, Richard John
Neuhaus, Samuel Ravinove, Rodney Smith, and Marc Stern for comments on an earlier version.
1. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 183 (1844).
2. Id. at 129-34.
3. The mere judicial enforcement of a will containing a racially discriminatory devise, without
more, would probably not constitute "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment that
authorized private racial discrimination by recognizing the right of private property holders to
dispose of their property to whomever they choose). But the operation of a racially discriminatory
school by the government is certainly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 133. The will provided: "[N]o ecclesiastic, missionary, or minis-
ter of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said
college; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the
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Justice Joseph Story acknowledged in his opinion for the Court
that "the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsyl-
vania," within the limits provided for in Pennsylvania's Bill of
Rights.' A decade before the Girard case, Story had written in his
influential treatise on the American Constitution: "The real object
of the [first] amendment [of the Federal Constitution] was, not to
countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism [sic], or Juda-
ism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all ri-
valry among Christian sects . . . ." It is thus understandable that
Story would have found problematic a hypothetical devise for the
establishment of a school or college "for the propagation of Juda-
ism, or Deism, or any other form of infidelity."' But he fortunately
chose to leave that problem to another day and turned back the ac-
tual attack on the will, noting that Stephen Girard had not prohib-
ited the teaching of Christianity in the college he sought to estab-
lish, but had merely excluded clerics from doing so.8 This close
reading of the will preserved it from invalidity on the asserted
ground that it was "derogatory and hostile to the Christian
premises appropriated to the purposes of said college." Id.
5. Id. at 198. Story quoted the relevant provision of the state constitution:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God accord-
ing to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to
attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his
consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience; and no preference shall ever .be given by law to any religious
establishments or modes of worship.
Id.
6. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1871
(1833).
7, Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 198. Later in his opinion Justice Story wrote:
Suppose the testator had excluded all religious instructors but Catholics, or Quakers,
or Swedenborgians; or, to put a stronger case, he had excluded all religious instructors
but Jews, would the bequest have been void on that account? . . . The truth is, that
in cases of this sort, it is extremely difficult to draw any just and satisfactory line of
distinction in a free country as to the qualifications or disqualifications which may be
insisted upon by the donor of a charity as to those who shall administer or partake of
his bounty.
Id. at 199.
8. Id. Story quoted from Girard's will:
In making this restriction, I do not mean to cast any reflection upon any sect or
person whatsoever. But as there is a multitude of sects, and such a diversity of opinion
amongst them, I desire to keep the tender minds of the orphans, who are to derive
advantage from this bequest, free from the excitement which clashing doctrines and
sectarian controversy are so apt to produce.
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religion." 9
We have come a long way since this fight over an otherwise ob-
scure will in the mid-nineteenth century. In today's jurisprudence,
the remotest possibility that any religious instruction would be aided
financially by the government suffices for a judicial finding that a
provision violates the prohibition of an establishment of religion. 10
For example, in Aguilar v. Felton," the fear of potential entangle-
ment between the government and church-operated schools sufficed
to invalidate a federal program involving public school employees
who provided remedial reading and math training both in the gov-
ernment's schools and in church-operated schools. 12 The Supreme
Court reached this result despite a splendid record of effective assis-
tance to students of low-income parents for nearly twenty years
without any evidence whatsoever of the "'detailed monitoring and
close -administrative contact' between secular and religious bod-
ies,""13 which the Court has sometimes thought necessary to make
out a claim of excessive entanglement.
The term "excessive" obviously admits of degrees. In other words,
entanglement is in the eyes of the beholder.' 4 Thus Chief Justice
Burger, who wrote the opinion of the Court in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,15 which articulated the entanglement test, was not persuaded
in Aguilar that "the interaction occasioned by the program at issue
presents any threat to the values underlying the Establishment
Clause..' He wrote in dissent:
I cannot join in striking down a program that, in the words of the Court of
Appeals, "has done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm." The
notion that denying these services to students in religious schools is a neutral
act to protect us from an Established Church has no support in logic, experi-
ence, or history. Rather than showing the neutrality the Court boasts of, it
exhibits nothing less than hostility toward religion and the children who at-
tend church-sponsored schools."'
9. Id. at 197.
10. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . U.S. CONST.
amend. 1.
11. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
12. Id. at 414.
13. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 395 (1990).
14. See Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses: A Ten Year As-
sessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1217-18 (1980).
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. 473 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
17. Id. (citation omitted).
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It must also be observed that entanglement is much harder to prove
when a religious body is subjected to a very complicated tax on dis-
tribution of religious literature to its own adherents' 8 than when
children attending a religious school are being given help to improve
their reading and 'rithmetic skills on an evenhanded basis with those
attending the government's schools. 9
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Aguilar illustrates that some
Justices view considerable parts of the Court's modern interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment as hostile to religion.20 It also provides
a link with the Girard case. Both in the earlier case and in the mod-
ern Court's official teaching about the First Amendment, the Court
has noted that official governmental hostility to religion is not man-
dated by our Constitution.2 ' For example, in the famous Bible read-
18. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
19. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
20. Quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Chief Justice Burger wrote in his dissent
in Aguilar: "'The First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of Church and State. . . . Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each
other - hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.'" 473 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See
also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (criticizing the endorsement test as "neutrality in name but hostility in
fact"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the Court's "unjustified hostility
toward religion"); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 36 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that the government must guard against latent dangers of hostility to religion); Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616-17 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids state action intended to disapprove, inhibit, or evince hostility toward
religion); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 554 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he First Amendment 'requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.' " (quoting Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947))); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 85 (1985) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("[Hlostility toward any religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden by
the Constitution as is an official establishment of religion."); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395
(1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court should
not "throw its weight on the side of those who believe that our society as a whole should be a
purely secular one"); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[g]overnment in our democracy ... must be neutral in matters of religious theory,
doctrine, and practice," not "hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion" (quoting
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968))); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 311-
12 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that governmental hostility to religion or to religious
teachings "'would be at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.' " (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
211-12 (1948))).
21. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) ("We express no hostility to
[religious] aspiration, nor would our oath permit us to do so."); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (finding a section of the Internal Revenue Code to have no "animus to
religion in general or to Scientology in particular"); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
266
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ing case of 1963,22 the Supreme Court ruled - sensibly in my
view2" -- that teachers in schools operated by the government may
not read verses of the Bible or lead young schoolchildren in a devo-
480 U.S. 136, 142 n.7 (1987) (noting that viewing a religiously motivated resignation from em-
ployment as "without good cause" would exhibit hostility toward religion (citing Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693 (1986))); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (same) (citing Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 n.4 (1963)); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 (1986) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (upholding an Air Force rule that prohibited personnel from wearing yarmulkes
while in uniform because the rule was based on a neutral, objective standard, not motivated by
hostility against any religious faith); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471
U.S. 290, 306 n.32 (1985)'(finding no evidence that the government's actions resulted from hostil-
ity to religious beliefs); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (stating that the Constitu-
tion forbids hostility toward any religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 810-11 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnment cannot, without adopting a decidedly anti-religious
point of view, be forbidden to recognize the religious beliefs and practices of the American people
as an aspect of our history and culture."); id. at 812 (" '[Hlostility, not neutrality, would charac-
terize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by
the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion.'" (quoting School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring))); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
254-55 (1982) (finding evidence of hostility towards "Moonies" behind differential regulation);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that preventing
those most intensely involved in religion from serving in public office manifests patent hostility
toward religion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793
(1973) (deciding that, if taxation of religion is viewed as hostility, an exemption represents a
reasonable attempt to guard against that danger); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)
(deciding that an exemption for Amish students from compulsory schooling was needed to remove
them from an environment hostile to their religious beliefs); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Nleither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is the
goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672
(1970) (holding that the purpose of a tax exemption was neither sponsorship of religion nor hostil-
ity toward it); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (holding that government may
not be hostile to any religion); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (deciding that
a state may not establish a "religion of secularism" by showing hostility to religion); id. at 232
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that eliminating devotional prayer from public schools does
"not declare that the First Amendment manifests hostility" to religion); id. at 295 ("[Tlhe First
Amendment commands not official hostility toward religion, but only a strict neutrality in matters
of religion."); id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution does not com-
mand "brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-34 (1962) (finding no hostility toward religion or
prayer indicated in a prohibition of state-composed prayer); id. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring)
("The First Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to religion. ... );
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961) (holding that a ban on Sunday rest laws would
be hostile to the public welfare); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating that the
Constitution does not require that the government show "callous indifference" to religious groups);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) (stating that hostility to religion or
religious teachings would be "at war" with free exercise of religion); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the es-
sence of religious freedom is that no religion shall incur the state's hostility).
22. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
23. For a detailed account of the strong opposition to this decision, see KENNETH M. DOLBEARE
& PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE
(1971).
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tional recitation of the Lord's Prayer without violating the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment.24 In a separate concurring
opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote of "a brooding and perva-
sive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to
the religious," which he said is "not only not compelled by the Con-
stitution, but . . .[is] prohibited by it." 2 The subtitle of this article
could be: "Where is Justice Goldberg when we need him?"
It should not be very difficult to embrace the concept that the
Constitution prohibits hostility to religion. As I demonstrate below,
this concept is fundamental both to the elimination of religious tests
for federal office in the original Constitution,26 and to any sensible
interpretation of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment,
which was enacted to promote religious liberty by removing from
the federal government the power to establish any religion and the
power to impose excessive burdens on religious beliefs and
practices.*'
As obvious as this conclusion might be to some, it seems to me
that many remain to be persuaded on the matter. I do not assume,
for example, that my own convictions about the central meaning of
the First Amendment Religion Clause are widely shared among le-
gal educators. I cannot prove this empirically, but I assume that by
and large we completely ignore the ban on religious tests in our cur-
riculum, and that many of us teach the Establishment Clause as
though it were the part of the Constitution designed to keep religion
in its place, that is, out of the public discourse to the greatest extent
possible. One of the predicates for these negative attitudes about
religious liberty among academics seems to be an uncritical socio-
logical assumption that America is a firmly secular nation.2" The
24. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
25. Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
26. -[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
27. See Michael W, McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990) (tracing the history of the enactment of the Free
Exercise Clause).
28. For comment on the tendency of academics to misperceive and trivialize religion, see Ste-
phen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J.
977, and Jacob Neusner, The Campus Conspiracy on the Religious Order, NAT'L REV., Mar. 14,
1986, at 37. On the attitudes of legal academics toward religion, see KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 5-6 (1988) and MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 10 (1988). In these volumes, Greenawalt and Perry
have helped to open the discussion of the appropriate role of religion in public discourse. For a
critical appreciation of Greenawalt's argument, see Franklin 1. Gamwell, Book Note, 8 J.L. &
[Vol. 42:263
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empirical data on this question support an opposite conclusion: reli-
gion, in fact, is thriving in America. 9 This in turn is explained in
part by the firm commitment to religious freedom that has come to
characterize the American experiment at its best, but that has re-
grettably been absent from our common experience when we behave'
at our worst.
Perhaps for the very reason that religion seems to be thriving
here, Americans tend to take religious freedom for granted, and we
seldom explore the phenomenon of hostility to religion that has
marred our history from the outset and that continues to cause
trouble in our own times. We should be grateful, then, that this
symposium affords us an opportunity to explore this forgotten di-
mension of our history.
Hostility to religion in America has assumed different forms in
the roughly four centuries from the colonial period through the
early federal period down to the present stage of the Republic.
Sometimes this ideological hostility resides within individuals. Thus,
Justice Black noted in Board of Education v. Allen3 0 that some of
our citizens are "bitterly hostile to and completely intolerant of the
[religious faith of] others.""1 Sometimes hostility to religion is struc-
RELIGION 461 (1990) (reviewing GREENAWALT, supra). Greenawalt replied to Gamwell in Reli-
gious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1019
(1990). For a very different view of religion, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (1980). For my reply to Perry and for commentary on the secularist thrust of
Bruce Ackerman's social project, see Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Politics without Brackets on
Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TULANE L. REV.
1143 (1989). For the view that explicitly religious arguments must be avoided in public discourse
so as to avoid the repetition of the holy wars of the sixteenth century, see William P. Marshall,
The Public Square and the Other Side of Religion (forthcoming 44 HASTINGS L.J. (1993)) and
Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1096-97 (1990). The fears of
Professors Marshall and Solum might be allayed if the virtues of technical competence, civil intel-
ligibility, and political courtesy were viewed as imperatives for both religious and nonreligious
participants in public policy debate. See Gaffney, supra, at 1188-94; see also FREDERICK MARK
GEDICKS & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC LIFE (1991); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L.
REV. 671 (1992).
29. See, e.g., GEORGE GALLUP & JAMES CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH
IN THE 90'S (1989); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, UNSECULAR AMERICA 12 (1986); ROBERT
WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD
WAR I1 (1988); THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGION (Andrew M. Greeley & Gregory Baum eds.,
1973).
30. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
31. Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that many religious beliefs and practices of minorities
are "not shared" and are "viewed with hostility" by the majority); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (stating that there is little left of religious freedom if a jury in a hostile
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tural in the sense that general cultural patterns are reflected within
the institutions of government, including the courts. Thus, in the
view of some commentators, some of Justice Black's own opinions
manifest the very hostility and intolerance of which he wrote.3 2 As
any therapist knows, hostile people are usually the last ones to ac-
knowledge their hostility.
The Williamsburg Charter, a bicentennial document celebrating
religious freedom, has identified several forms of confusion about
the relation between religion and politics that culminate in official
governmental hostility toward religion."3 Two are particularly note-
worthy. "Politics has recently been inflamed by a number of confu-
sions: the confusion of personal religious affiliation with qualification
or disqualification for public office . . . and the confusion of govern-
ment neutrality among faiths with government ... hostility to
religion. 34
In this Essay, I comment on these two confusions, and then I sug-
gest a connection between the history of hostility to religion in
America and the confused state of constitutional jurisprudence
about religious freedom that continues to plague us in the present. I
do not attempt here a grand theory that explains why a move away
from hostility for religion is not coterminous with special preference
for religion or that argues why the absence of hostility would not
entail large gobs of public funds for religious institutions. My pur-
pose in this Essay is more humble: to state simply that Americans
have been hostile to two religious communities - Muslims and Ro-
man Catholics 35 - throughout our history, and that we continue to
reap the ill effects of this hostility.
environment could send a person to jail for false teachings).
32. See Michael W. McConnell, Exchange; Religious Participation in Public Programs; Reli-
gious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 121-22 (1992); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 91-95 (discussing Allen).
33. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER (1988), reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIGION 5 (1990). The docu-
ment was signed in Williamsburg, Virginia, on June 25, 1988, the 200th anniversary of the call by
Virginia for a Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution.
34. Id. at 21.
35. The history of hostility toward other religious groups in America (e.g., Jews, Mormons,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Fundamentalists, Hare Krishna devotees, and adherents of the Unification
Church) is part of an ongoing project of which this is a first installment.
[Vol. 42:263
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I. THE EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS FROM PUBLIC
LIFE
The first illustration of hostility to religion that I treat in this Es-
say has both a specific focus - religious tests for public office, in
the period of established religion - and a more general focus - the
drift toward secularism, in our own time. I will comment on both
the specific historic problem and the more general contemporary
problem.
One of the vices of the regime of an established religion was that
some citizens were given prominence in the community by virtue of
their religious convictions, while others were effectively excluded
from participation in public life because of their religious convic-
tions and practices.36 Thus, it is no accident that the emergence of
"the Church of England, by law established ' 37 in the period of the
Tudor and Stuart monarchs entailed severe civil and criminal penal-
ties for Roman Catholics and dissenting Protestants. 8 A similar
pattern of penalties imposed on nonmembers of the established or-
der held sway in the American colonies. Far from being the idyllic
"freedom-loving" folk that Justice Black imagined the colonists to
be,39 the colonists imposed the harshest restraints and the cruelest
sanctions for nonconformity to the various orthodoxies and
orthopraxies that they established along the Atlantic seaboard."'
Among these penalties was the exclusion of nonmembers of the es-
tablished church from political life. They were denied both the
franchise and the ability to serve in public office. This historical
problem was solved at the federal level by the ban on religious tests
in Article VI of the Federal Constitution. At the state level, how-
36. See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND
EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 92-110 (1964); ALBERT J. ME-
NENDEZ, No RELIGIOUS TEST: THE STORY OF OUR CONSTITUTION'S FORGOTTEN ARTICLE (1987);
Leo J. Pfeffer, Religious Test for Public Office, 12 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 677 (1967).
37. The phrase is taken from the Canons of 1604, which were intended to inaugurate the reign
of James I (1603-1625) with a definitive codification of the church-state relationship that had
been developed under Elizabeth 1 (1558-1603). For a thoughtful discussion of these arrangements,
see ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAY AUTHORITY AND REFORMATION IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH: ED-
WARD I TO THE CIVIL WAR 114-92 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Toleration Act, I W. & M., ch. 18 (1689); Second Test Act, 30 Car. 2, ch. 1
(1678); First Test Act, 25 Car. 2, ch. 2 (1673); Act of Uniformity, 14 Car. 2, ch. 4 (1662);
Corporation Act, 13 Car. 2, ch. 1 (1661); Oaths Act, 7 & 8 Jam., ch. 6 (1610); Act of Uniform-
ity, I Eliz., ch. 1 (1559); Act Abolishing Diversity of Opinions, 31 Hen. 8, ch. 14 (1539).
39. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
40. See ANTIEAU, supra note 36; THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
1992]
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ever, this problem was resolved very slowly.4 ' The last remaining
vestige of inhibitions on public service relating to the religious con-
victions of a potential office holder - banning clergy from serving
in the state legislature and at state constitutional conventions -
was invalidated in 1978 in McDaniel v. Paty.
42
I turn now to the more general contemporary problem, but I will
occasionally illustrate it by reference to the particular historical
problem. The exclusion of people from the political process goes to
the very heart of our self-understanding as a national community.
As the Warren Court knew well, a large political community such
as the United States tells those who live here who counts and who
does not by telling them whether or not they may vote or hold office
or otherwise participate in public life. After Chief Justice Warren
retired from the bench in 1969, he used to entertain law students in
his chambers. It became an expected ritual that one of the students
would ask the Chief Justice what was the best thing he had done for,
the Republic. Warren would then reply that his decision in Reyn-
olds v. Sims,13 enshrining the "one person, one vote" rule, was his
most important contribution to the Republic, because it placed
equality of participation on a firm footing. Without that, he
thought, the very possibility of democracy was deeply eroded.44
Recently, Justice O'Connor has suggested a similar theme in Es-
41. For a moving description of the efforts to remove the political stigmas attached to Jews in
the early Republic, see MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS (1984).
42. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
43. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
44. I had heard several of my classmates recount this story. So when I got my chance to visit
the Chief Justice, I decided to ask him to identify the worst mistake he had made in public life,
which included service as District Attorney for Alameda County, Attorney General, and Governor
of California, before he was appointed Chief Justice in 1953. He noted my impertinence, said that
law students usually asked about the best thing he had done for the Republic, and then played the
Reynolds v. Sims cassette. Then he acknowledged that he had not answered my question because
he had been overcome with a rush of memories of mistakes. In an act of extraordinary humility,
he identified his silence as Attorney General of California in the face of the incarceration of
Japanese-Americans at the outset of World War !1, his service on the Warren Commission on the
Kennedy Assassination, and his vote in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (dismissing a case
challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's miscegenation statute), as among his worst mis-
takes. Chief Justice Warren wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court in Loving v. Common-
wealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), invalidating Virginia's miscegenation statute. Warren's
third self-perceived mistake sheds light on the debate between Alex Bickel and Gerald Gunther
over the "activism" of the Warren Court. Compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court,
1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 79 (1961) (praising the use of
threshold barriers to avoid decisions) with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5
(1964) (criticizing such use as unprincipled).
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tablishment Clause litigation. The Establishment Clause is offended,
she wrote in the first creche case, Lynch v. Donnelly," if the govern-
ment sends a message of approval to those in a preferred religious
community and of disapproval to those who are not members of this
preferred group." Although some commentators do not give much
hope that the endorsement theory will provide any greater coherence
to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause than earlier for-
mulations by the Court,47 it does at least encapsulate an important
theme from the history of established religions.
In his reply to Professor Hauerwas" in this symposium, Professor
Gedicks has illustrated the theme of hostility to his own religious
community, the Mormons.49 As I mentioned above, this Essay illus-
trates the theme with reference to Muslims, a community often ig-
nored in American history, and with reference to my own commu-
nity, the Roman Catholics. If the stories I recount here were simply
a thing of the past, we might be justified in paying less attention to
these sad realities at a time in our national history when we are
called to celebrate the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights. But the
duty to tell the stories of communities that have experienced denial
of their religious freedom in America strikes me as necessary at this
45. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
46. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A year later, a majority of the Court cited Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test favorably in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389
(1985). A majority also used the test in the second creche case, County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989). Professor Tribe takes the endorsement
notion much further than the Court has gone, arguing that government invalidly endorses a reli-
gion whenever it uses religious means where nonreligious ones would suffice. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1287-97 (2d ed. 1988). In my way of thinking, Tribe epito-
mizes the "pervasive devotion to the secular" of which Justice Goldberg warned in his concurring
opinion in School Board v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
47. For a critical view of the endorsement standard, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Percep-
tions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86
MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987); see also McConnell, supra note 27, at 147-57 (criticizing the endorse-
ment test).
48. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' Is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107 (1992).
49. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormom Response to Stanley
Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167 (1992); see Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding the seizure of assets of a church until
it changed its religious convictions); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (sustaining a test oath
prohibiting orthodox Mormons from voting in federal territory because of their beliefs on plural
marriages); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding the imposition of criminal
sanctions on orthodox Mormons because of conduct relating to plural marriages); see also GUSTA-
VUS MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 158-62 (1943); TRIBE, supra note 46,
at 1271-72; Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST.
LJ. 409, 416-17 (1986).
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moment because Muslims and Roman Catholics continue to experi-
ence misunderstanding and hostility from their fellow citizens.
A. Hostility to Muslims in America
"Religious persecution" is not too strong a term to describe the
experience of the first Muslims in America. These persons were
brought to these shores involuntarily from West Africa as slaves.
The story of the African slave trade is a complicated one, involving,
for example, the complicity of some West African leaders in the
exploitation of their own people. The exportation of West Africans
in the slave trade, moreover, is not entirely one of white oppression
of blacks; some of the most notorious slave traders were themselves
Africans selling their fellow Africans into captivity. Many of the
West Africans were animists rather than Muslims. These complica-
tions, however, do not gainsay the brutality of the white slave trad-
ers both in the dangerous crossing of the Atlantic 50 and in the legal
structure they erected to define and control the slaves who survived
the passage "out of darkness."5 1 Both before and after the enact-
ment of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment, one of the
many cruelties inflicted upon the black slaves by their white "mas-
ters" was the lack of respect for the Muslim heritage often reflected
in forced "conversions" to Christianity.52
The major contours of the "execrable commerce" - to use the
phrase Thomas Jefferson penned for a draft of the Declaration of
Independence5" - are well known. The primary responsibility for
50. For a graphic account of the perils of the slave ships, see ALEX HALEY, ROOTS: THE SAGA
OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY 159-92 (1976).
51. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 29-
64 (1976).
52. See ALLAN D. AUSTIN, AFRICAN MUSLIMS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: A SOURCEBOOK
(1984).
53. Jefferson put before Congress a form of the declaration that originally contained the follow-
ing paragraph about the slave trade:
[George Ill] has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating it's [sic] most
sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended
him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere or to incur mis-
erable death in their transportation thither. [Tihis piratical warfare, the opprobrium
of infidel powers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain. [D]etermined
to keep open a market where Men should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his
negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execra-
ble commerce. [Aind that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distin-
guished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to
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the brutality of this traffic in human flesh belongs to the Europeans,
primarily the Dutch and the English. Although the imposition of
religious faith was brought about primarily through the agency of
private slave-holders, our government may not avoid responsibility
for this massive denial of religious liberty, if only because of its
clear complicity in and official support for the "peculiar institution"
of slavery until its abolition through the Thirteenth Amendment.5 4
If African Muslims experienced religious persecution in the form
of forced conversion when they got to America, they were also the
victims of religious bigotry as a religious minority in the early pe-
riod of the history of the Republic. Even after the movement for
disestablishment of a single religious community, accomplished at
the federal level through the adoption of the First Amendment and
at the state level through the passage of Bills of Rights in the state
constitutions from 1776 to 1833, Muslims were not regarded as the
subjects of the religious freedom that was secured by those charters
of liberty. Both the franchise and office-holding were limited to
Christians in all of the first state constitutions. In the overwhelming
majority of the states, these rights of political participation were
limited more particularly to Protestants, a point that I will return to
later. "Jews, Turks, and Infidels (or any other exotic group) ...
could worship as they pleased but had no right to participate in...
government."55 As noted above, Justice Joseph Story suggested in
his commentary on the American Constitution that the purpose of
the First Amendment was not to prostrate Christianity "but to ex-
clude all rivalry among Christian sects."5" It bears repetition that
Story expressly noted that the purpose of the First Amendment was
not to "countenance, much less advance Mahometanism [sic], or Ju-
purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on
whom he also obtruded them: thus paying off former crimes committed against the
Liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives
of another.
I THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 317-18 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950). The passage was
struck out at the insistence of the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia, who, in Jefferson's
words, "had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still
wished to continue it." I Id. at 314. See GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DEC-
LARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 65-75 (1978).
54. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM
SOUTH (1964).
55. BORDEN, supra note 41, at ix. Borden offers a rich study of the Jewish struggle for religious
equality in America, but does not include an exploration of the story of the Turks or other Infidels
(including Muslims and Roman Catholics) in this volume.
56. 3 STORY, supra note 6, § 1871.
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daism, or infidelity." 7
Nearly 160 years after Story's commentary, Muslims are not sub-
jected to formal, de jure disqualification from the franchise or from
holding public office. But there is strong evidence of widespread hos-
tility towards Muslims in our society that may lead to a reasonable
perception on their part that they are widely regarded as outsiders
or second-class citizens. For example, a national opinion survey in
1987 indicated that 13% of the American public think "there is no
place in America for the Moslem religion. ' 58
One way in which a culture may manifest its passive aggression
against a minority group is by ignoring the beliefs and achievements
of the members of that group. For example, despite the fact that
there are more Muslims in the United States than, say, Epis-
copalians, there is a massive silence about Muslims in the major
texts purporting to examine the history of religion in the United
States.59 Muslims are even omitted from general reference sources
on American history which contain extensive materials on other reli-
gious groups.6 0 Accurate information about the Islamic faith by
Muslim scholars is insufficiently found even in the libraries of major
research universities, let alone in public libraries to which the ma-
jority of Americans have easy access.
Still worse is active hostility toward a minority group perpetuated
through negative images or false stereotypes. Muslims are subject to
this form of aggression not only through unfair or biased reporting
in the mass media of communication,6 1 but also in the educational
message inculcated in American youth through history texts
adopted for use in public elementary and secondary schools.62
Against this background of insensitivity to Islam in American cul-
ture generally and against the most recent perception of at least
57. Id.
58. CENTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS DYNATICS, WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER SURVEY ON RELIGION
AND PUBLIC LIFE 18 (1988) [hereinafter WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER SURVEY]. See James Davison
Hunter, The Williamsburg Charter Survey: Methodology and Findings, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 257,
264 (1990).
59. See, e.g., SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1975);
ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950).
60. See, e.g., HARVARD GUIDE TO AMERICAN HISTORY (Frank B. Friedel & Richard K. Show-
man eds., 2d ed. 1974).
61. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETER-
MINE How WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD (1981); JACK G. SHAHEEN, THE TV ARAB (1984).
62. See, e.g., Testimony of Audrey Shabbas on behalf of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimina-
tion Committee, California State Board of Education, June 10, 1987.
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some Muslims (e.g., Shiites in Iran) as analogous in some respects
to Fundamentalists, it causes small wonder that there is still wide-
spread animosity among Americans today towards Muslims in our
society."
In addition, Muslims continue to experience lack of accommoda-
tion to their religious beliefs and practices similar to that afforded to
the members of other religious communities. Professor McConnell
has argued convincingly that accommodation of religion should not
be confined to instances compelled by the Free Exercise Clause be-
cause "the government is in a better position than the courts to eval-
uate the strength of its own interest in governing without religious
exemptions.""" Yet the duty of accommodation of religious beliefs
and practices, whether mandated under the Free Exercise Clause or
extended to religious communities by legislative enactments more
generous than the demands of the First Amendment, is not absolute.
Thus the government need not accommodate a religious conviction
if the state interest behind a particular public policy is truly "com-
pelling," "paramount," or "of the highest order."65 An example of
an interest of this nature is the requirement of reasonable security
in penal institutions.
Even when the government asserts interests that compel it to re-
strict religious freedom, however, it may not do so in a way that
singles out a particular religion for unfavorable treatment. Thus,
when members of the majority religious traditions in America (Prot-
estants, Catholics, and Jews) are in fact accommodated within penal
institutions both with respect to dietary requirements and with re-
spect to times of communal prayer without any noticeable diminu-
tion of the government's interest in prison security," it is insensitive
63. See ISLAMIC CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS: THE NEW
TREND (1988).
64. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 31.
65. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (holding that the state interest in
universal compulsory education is not sufficiently important to outweigh the parental interest in
religious upbringing of children). But see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (holding
that a broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order that it
outweighs religious belief in conflict with payment of Social Security tax).
66. 66. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (requiring that a Buddhist prisoner be
afforded "a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded
fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts"); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492
(2d Cir. 1975) (requiring a federal prison to provide an Orthodox Jewish prisoner with a diet that
would keep the prisoner in good health without violating kosher laws); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410
F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring a prison to accommodate dietary requirements of Muslim
prisoners).
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- to say the very least - for prison officials not to extend similar
accommodation to Muslims within their jurisdiction. In O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz,6 7 however, the Supreme Court upheld prison
regulations regarding work by prisoners outside the prison that pre-
cluded Muslim prisoners from attending religious services on Friday
afternoons.68 More recently, in Hunafa v. Murphy, 9 the Seventh
Circuit remanded a suit by a Muslim state prisoner who had ob-
jected to service of meals containing pork.70 The court noted that
the Supreme Court's ruling in the 1990 peyote case, Employment
Division v. Smith,71 had "cut back, possibly to minute dimensions,
the doctrine that requires government to accommodate, at some
cost, minority religious preferences. '7 Nearly a year later in Al-
Alamin v. Gramley,13 another panel in the same court curiously ig-
nored Smith even though the case also involved a religious claim by
a Muslim prisoner. The Al-Alamin court relied instead on Turner v.
Safley74 to turn back a request by Muslim prisoners for access to an
imam to lead them in the traditional Friday prayer service of Mus-
lims, known as Jumah, or to join together for Friday prayer without
an imam, but with appropriate supervision by the prison staff.7 5
Both Hunafa and Al-Alamin have a ring of technical correctness to
them, but they manifest indifference, if not overt hostility, towards
Muslims. It is doubtful that the cases would have come out the
same way if the plaintiffs had been Roman Catholics complaining
about denial of access to the Mass, or Orthodox Jews complaining
about violations of their dietary laws.
Even under Smith it is clear that the benefits of the Free Exercise
Clause must extend equally to all.76 And governmental preference of
67. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
68. Id. at 345.
69. 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 48.
71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 139-44 (discussing Smith).
72. 907 F.2d at 48.
73. 926 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1991).
74. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prison regulations impinging on religious rights of
prisoners are valid if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests").
75. 926 F.2d at 683, 686.
76. 494 U.S. 873, 888 (1990). The Court has granted review in a case involving a religious
gerrymander. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court has
agreed to review whether city ordinances specifically directed at the sacrifice of animals in a reli-
gious ritual, while permitting the killing of animals for such other purposes as food, science, con-
venience, or sport, violate the Free Exercise Clause. 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), afl'd,
936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992).
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one religious group over another is the very thing prohibited by the
Establishment Clause." For these reasons, when the courts approve
manifest disparity in treatment of Muslims by the government, the
lack of constitutional protection for this religious minority is
deplorable.
B. Hostility to Roman Catholics in America
Like Muslims, Roman Catholic colonists in America also exper-
ienced religious persecution during the colonial period and into the
early years of the Republic. Indeed, one of the great ironies of
American history is that, like other Christians who came to
America in part to escape religious persecution in Tudor England,
Roman Catholics soon became victims of official persecution in this
land. For example, colonial Maryland was first envisaged as a haven
for Roman Catholics and Protestants living in harmony.78 Accord-
ing to this ideal, both groups would be free to practice their respec-
tive religions, and neither would enjoy any special favor from the
state.79 Even this limited experiment in religious toleration proved
impossible to survive in the polemical atmosphere of sectarian hos-
tility in the seventeenth century. The conflict between Catholics and
Protestants in Maryland was further complicated by economic, le-
gal, and political issues. In 1689, Protestants in Maryland who op-
posed the proprietary rule of the Calverts seized the government.
Shortly thereafter, the revolutionaries put an end to the experiment
in religious toleration of Catholics, in part because of the nearly uni-
versal stereotype of Catholics as disloyal.80 In 1692, Roman
Catholics were expressly excluded from holding public office by
means of oaths incompatible with their religious beliefs. In 1702,
the Church of England was officially established in Maryland. Soon
thereafter penal legislation 'sought both to stem the growth of Ca-
tholicism and to remove its influence from every aspect of public
life. 1
I mentioned above that political penalties were visited upon
77. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
78. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY 72-79 (1968).
79. Although the early Maryland experiment provided for the free exercise of religion for
Christians, it imposed the severest penalties, including confiscation of goods and capital punish-
ment, on those who exceeded the limits of Christian orthodoxy. See CURRY, supra note 40, at 39.
80. For example, Catholics were widely supposed to be plotting with the French and the Indi-
ans to suppress the Protestant population. Id. at 45-47. See also MYERS, supra note 49, at 35-43.
81. CURRY, supra note 40, at 48-51.
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"Jews, Turks, and Infidels" in the early Republic. I return now to
this point to highlight the fact that Romans Catholics were "infi-
dels" for purposes of these civil penalties. Even after the movement
for disestablishment of a single religious community not only at the
federal level but also in the overwhelming majority of the new state
constitutions, Roman Catholics were still not deemed worthy of full
participation in the early Republic. Although the Federal Constitu-
tion removed religious tests for serving in federal offices, several
state constitutions in the period of the early Republic continued ei-
ther to disenfranchise Roman Catholics and other non-Protestants
or to prohibit them from serving in public office.82 This unequal
treatment under the law was rationalized in part because the loyalty
of Roman Catholics was suspect, due to false stereotypes of the
transnational allegiance that arose from the catholic character of
this faith community.
In addition, Roman Catholics were subjected to overt hostility
and bigotry throughout the nineteenth century and into the early
twentieth century. There were three waves of this anti-Catholic hys-
teria in the nineteenth century. The first and longest lasting of these
movements was Nativism, according to which repulsion for foreign-
ers was virtually synonymous with hostility to Catholics.8 Nativist
sentiment may be found early in the federal period. As an organized
movement, Nativism lasted roughly from 1830 - the year in which
some Protestant clergy in New York launched an overtly anti-Cath-
olic weekly newspaper, The Protestant - to the mid-1920s, when
immigration had changed the face, if not the heart, of America ir-
revocably. In its heyday, Nativism was responsible not simply for
the ignorant mobs who literally burned down convents and churches
in the 1830s, B4 but also for the virulent anti-Catholic attitudes of
82. CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 100-04, 115-16
(1965); SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 8, 35-36,
299, 337, 356, 358, 445, 447-49, 452, 503, 515, 519 (1902); 1 STOKES, supra note 59, at 859.
83. See JOHN TRACY ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 61-69 (2d ed. 1969); JOHN HIGHAM,
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1963); MARK J. HUR-
LEY, THE UNHOLY GHOST: ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1992); MYERS,
supra note 49; at 110-28. The main burden of Hurley's book is to describe the efforts of the
Catholic Church to renew and reform itself, primarily in the events of the Second Vatican Council
(1962-1965) in which Hurley was himself a key participant. His narrative helps to transcend
many of the difficulties that Protestants and others had with Catholics in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. It contains, however, frequent references to historical manifestations of anti-
Catholicism in that earlier period.
84. ELLIS, supra note 83, at 64.
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intellectuals like Horace Mann, whose "common schools" masked
only slightly the common contempt for Catholicism. 8
The second wave of opposition to Catholicism was aptly styled the
Know-Nothing movement. 86 Like the Nativists before them, the
Know-Nothings targeted the immigrant Catholics for special oppro-
brium. They peaked as a movement in the 1850s and began to wane
in the early 1860s, when the need for Catholics in the Union Army
counted for more than the earlier anti-Catholic bias.
The third wave of anti-Catholicism hit after the Civil War. Two
venomous groups, the American Protective Association (APA) 87 and
the Ku Klux Klan, 8 poisoned the atmosphere with virulent attacks
on Jews, Catholics, and African-Americans. The Klan faded with
the enactment of new civil rights legislation in the 1870s, only to
rise again in the 1920s. The APA remained potent as a social force
until the turn of the century.
As in the Muslim experience, so also the Catholic experience of
hostility in the past was but a prologue to an ongoing phenomenon.
Conditions have ameliorated dramatically for Catholics in the late
twentieth century, on any measure of comparison with the condi-
tions of their immigrant ancestors in the nineteenth century. Al-
though Catholics have achieved greater acceptance in American so-
ciety than in the past,90 they continue to be victimized by unfair
stereotypical characterizations in several important ways. Hostile at-
titudes towards Catholics are reflected not only in subtle forms of
employment discrimination,9 1 but even in misrepresentations of the
85. See CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); ROCKNE
M. MCCARTHY ET AL., DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME: GENUINE PLURALISM FOR AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (1982); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS, NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973: A
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS A BATTLE FIELD OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1974).
86. See ELLIS, supra note 83, at 85-86; HIGHAM, supra note 83, at 4-7, 12-13, 28; HURLEY,
supra note 83, at 128, 137, 160; MYERS, supra note 49, at 129-39, 149-62.
87. See ELLIS, supra note 83; HIGHAM, supra note 83, at 62-63, 80-87, 108; MYERS, supra note
49, at 163-92.
88. HIGHAM, supra note 83, at 287-88; MYERS, supra note 49, at 211-57.
89. See ANDREW M. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT (1977); AN-
DREW M. GREELEY, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC AMERICANS (1966).
90. The Williamsburg Charter Survey on Religion and Public Life reported that in 1987 only
8% of Americans indicated that they would not vote for a Catholic for president even if that
person were a member of the respondent's political party and the respondent liked his ideas. WIL-
LIAMSBURG CHARTER SURVEY, supra note 58, at 9. This response compares favorably with the
indication in a 1959 Gallup poll that 25% of Americans would exclude a Catholic from the presi-
dency solely on the ground of the candidate's religion. Id. See Hunter, supra note 58, at 266.
91. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION: A NEGLECTED IS-
SUE (1979).
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educational efforts of Roman Catholics at the highest level of gov-
ernmental decisionmaking. For example, in the New York textbook
loan case, Board of Education v. Allen,92 Justice Black was not
above exaggerating the Catholic drive for power. Having written the
opinion of the Court espousing the "no aid" view in Everson v.
Board of Education,5 Justice Black found himself on'the losing side
in Allen. In dissent, he characterized the Catholic school advocates
as "powerful religious propagandists" striving for "complete domi-
nation and supremacy of their particular brand of religion." '94 Re-
viewing the reasons why Catholics and Jews created their own
schools in the nineteenth century, Professor McConnell charges that
the "bigotry of Justice Black's language is particularly striking in
light of its historical context. . . .[It] turn[s] reality on its head."95
Throughout the decade of the 1970s, the principal targets for
anti-Catholic hostility were their parochial schools. Three years af-
ter Allen, it was Justice Douglas's turn to engage in ignorant com-
mentary on Catholicism from the bench of the nation's highest
court. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"6 which set the criteria for all the
parochial aid cases to follow, the Court ruled that public financial
assistance to teachers of secular subjects in parochial schools vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. 7 Douglas bolstered his view that
this form of aid was impermissible by citing one of the most notori-
ous anti-Catholic polemical tracts of recent times. 8
Toward the end of the decade, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
92. 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (authorizing the loans of secular textbooks to children attending paro-
chial schools).
93. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
94. 394 U.S. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting). For an astonishingly unflattering acknowledgement
of the hostile feelings that Justice Black had towards Roman Catholics generally, see his son's
folksy biography, HUGO BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE (1973).
95. McConnell, supra note 32, at 121-22.
96. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
97. Id. at 606-07.
98. Id. at 635 n.20 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). The book that Justice Douglas cited with
approval was LORAINE BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM (1962). For comment on this tract, see
Douglas Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 390, 418-21 (1977).
Perhaps the best way to grasp the vicious character of this tract is to compare some of its rhetoric
to well known hate tracts circulated by the Ku Klux Klan. As Laycock phrases it, Boettner sug-
gested that "an undue proportion of the gangsters, racketeers, thieves, and juvenile delinquents
who roam our big city streets come from the parochial schools." Id. at 420. A campaign pamphlet
against Al Smith circulated in 1928 suggested that voters repudiate Smith because he was associ-
ated with "the vice trust, the gamblers, the red-light and dope-ring vote .... [and] the Jew-
Jesuit movie gang who want sex films and Sunday shows to coin millions through the corruption of
youth." MYERS, supra note 49, at 324.
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proposed the use of tax credits to provide some relief for parents
who incur significant costs in sending their children to church-oper-
ated schools. His proposal was met with the charge that Roman
Catholic schools are "bastions of white privilege and exclusivity." 99
The description is wildly erroneous. Roman Catholic parochial
schools in the inner cities typically serve minority children, often not
of the Catholic faith. 100 For example, already by the early 1980s a
slightly higher percentage of children attending Catholic schools in
California were members of minority groups than were children at-
tending the government's schools in that state. 101
One may surely reach a conclusion that no public aid should be
given to church-operated schools without being anti-Catholic.
Catholics themselves are divided over the wisdom of accepting vari-
ous forms of financial assistance that might, for example, entail an
unacceptable risk of governmental interference in the educational
mission of the church. But that does not justify misleading and false
characterizations of that mission by those who attack it from outside
this religious community. In a moment of candor, the Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) recently acknowledged: "We iust take care that
our theological and ecclesiastical history of hostility to Roman Ca-
tholicism does not unconsciously continue to affect our constitutional
and public policy views [about funding for education in church-op-
erated schools]. '"1°2
99. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, What the Congress Can Do When the Court Is Wrong, in PRI-
VATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EIGHTIES 79, 81 (Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. ed., 1981).
100. For an empirical description of Catholic schools in several major cities, see JAMES SAMUEL
COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COM-
PARED (1982); see also JAMES G. CIBULKA ET AL.. INNER-CITY PRIVATE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS: A
STUDY (1982).
101. Dr. Joseph McElligot, a member of the National Advisory Council on the Education of
Disadvantaged Children stated that the minority population in Catholic elementary and secondary
schools in California is 44%, compared to 41% minority population in public schools. PRIVATE
SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD, supra note 99, at 65. See also ANDREW M. GREELEY, CATHO-
LIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND MINORITY STUDENTS (1982).
102. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), "God Alone Is Lord of the Conscience". Policy State-
ment and Recommendations Regarding Religious Liberty Adopted by the 200th General Assem-
bly (1988), reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIGION 331, 383 (1990). The Presbyterian and Reformed
Publishing Company, which is not an organ of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), published the
hate tract by Loraine Boettner. BOETTNER, supra note 98. For an example of nineteenth-century
polemics between a Presbyterian minister and a Roman Catholic priest, see JOHN HUGHES &
JOHN BRECKINRIDGE, A DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION, Is THE ROMAN CATHOLIC RELIGION, IN
ANY OR ALLITS PRINCIPLES, INIMICAL TO CIVIL OR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?. AND OF THE QUES-
TION. IS THE PRESBYTERIAN RELIGION, IN ANY OR ALL ITS PRINCIPLES, INIMICAL TO CIVIL OR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? (1836).
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Throughout the decade of the 1980s, the most prominent instance
of hostility towards Roman Catholics was the targeting of the lead-
ership of this community in litigation by private parties seeking to
use the courts to remove the tax-exempt status of the church be-
cause it allegedly violated the restrictions on political speech found
in the tax code when it made known its views on abortion. 03 After
years of costly litigation, the Supreme Court ruled that the church
was at least entitled to challenge the imposition of coercive fines
imposed on the church for its refusal to hand over massive amounts
of sensitive internal documents to outsiders.104 On remand, a divided
panel of the Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing
and dismissed the suit.'0 5 The Supreme Court declined to review
this judgment, 06 leaving the issue raised by the plaintiffs to be de-
cided later by another court, and perhaps, against a weaker church.
The good news from this protracted attack on the Catholic
Church was that the Golden Rule was observed by other religious
organizations, including groups that disagreed with the Catholic
Church on the merits of the abortion question. Religious organiza-
tions that joined an amicus brief in support of the United States
Catholic Conference included the American Jewish Congress, James
E. Andrews as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presby-
terian Church (U.S.A.), the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Af-
fairs, the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, The National Association of Evangelicals, the Na-
tional Council of Churches of Christ in the United States, the Syna-
gogue Council of America, and the Worldwide Church of God. All
of these groups joined forces to state that the autonomy and integ-
103. In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987); Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.
v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The United States Catholic Conference is the civil entity for the Roman Catho-
lic Bishops in the United States; the canonical entity is known as the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops. Both entities were sued at the outset of the litigation, but were dismissed as
defendants. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S.
72, 75 (1988). That ruling actually diminished the ability of the church to pursue its remedies
until the Supreme Court clarified that a witness has standing to bring an appeal challenging the
imposition of punitive sanctions for contempt of court. Id. at 76.
104. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72
(1988).
105. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989).
106. 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
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rity of all religious bodies are threatened by allowing.private parties
hostile to the moral teaching of a target church to seek a court order
revoking the exempt status of that religious body.10
All religious groups must retain the freedom to engage in public
discourse. This freedom has included the historical willingness of re-
ligious bodies in this country to exercise a critical voice in the public
order on a wide variety of issues, including the abolition of slavery
and the struggle for the protection of the civil and political rights of
racial minorities and of women.' 0 8 This freedom must continue to
enable religious bodies to act as agents for transmitting the opera-
tive values of society by formulating and articulating the moral as-
pects of political questions.0 9 Attempts to restrict this freedom to
speak and act in the public sphere are not well grounded in the
Constitution. 10
Anti-Catholic bigotry has been described as America's "invisible
prejudice" which occasionally becomes visible. It became highly vis-
ible on October 3, 1992, when the Irish singer, Sinead O'Connor,
sang a Bob Marley song on NBC's Saturday Night Live, after
which she identified Pope John Paul II as "the real enemy" (of
whom or what we were left to guess),"' and tore a large photo of
107. For a discussion of the ecumenical and interreligious character of the response of religious
communities to the Abortion Rights Mobilization case, see Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The
Abortion Rights Mobilization Case: Political Advocacy and Tax Exemption of Churches, in THE
ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 127 (James E. Wood ed., 1991).
108. See Gaffney, supra note 28, at 1166-75.
109. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (1984). As I noted above, the history of religious wars in the past has troubled
scholars like William Marshall and Lawrence Solum. See supra note 28. Neuhaus is not unmind-
ful of the fact that these wars "once destroyed the basis of civil life" and he states that "nobody
who cares about authentic politics should want to take that risk again," but he proposes better
speech - not less speech - as the cure to this ill. NEUHAUS, supra, at 260; see also MICHAEL J.
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991) (arguing that the quality of religious discourse relating to political matters improves with
broader ecumenical consensus among religious voices); Review Essays and Book Reviews, 8 J.L.
& RELIGION 397 (1990) (providing a comprehensive review of literature exploring the relation
between religion and politics in America in the past decade).
110. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality
of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 (1990); see also The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), supra note 102, at 383 (opposing
"attempts by government to limit or deny religious participation in public life by statute or regula-
tion, including Internal Revenue Service regulations on the amount or percentage of money used
to influence legislation, and prohibition of church intervention in political campaigns").
11. Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 3, 1992). Ms. O'Connor has subse-
quently disclosed that she is the victim of child abuse. One can empathize with her plight as a
victim of that sort of violence without agreeing that the spiritual leader of the church in which her
family members were raised is worthy of the public contempt she manifested.
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the Pope to bits before a nationwide television audience. 1
2
I offer here only a few less startling examples of the hostility to
Roman Catholics in American culture.' In 1989, Reverend
Timothy Healy, S.J., the former President of Georgetown Univer-
sity, was appointed President of the New York Public Library. Two
of the luminaries of American high culture, Gay Talese and Joseph
Heller, attacked Father Healy for having insufficient credentials as
an intellectual, a secularist, and a civil libertarian." 4 In a rare pro-
test against anti-Catholicism by the liberal media,"' the New Re-
public editorialized that:
[These attacks] have little to do with Healy's own record, with the position
of the Jesuit order, or with the present-day historic transformation of the
Catholic Church itself. Rather, they seem to be one of those recurrent in-
stances of Know-Nothing anti-Catholicism, once known, and justifiably so,
as the anti-Semitism of the liberals.1 16
112. Id. See also Lynette Holloway, Chronicle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at B2. NBC immedi-
ately issued a statement denying any previous knowledge that O'Connor was going to do what she
did, and apologizing to anyone who found O'Connor's act reprehensible. Statement of Curt Block,
Vice-President of NBC, to author. A week later, the show's host was actor Joe Pesci, who began
the program with the statement, "Sinead O'Connor tore up a picture of the Pope and I thought
that was wrong." Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1992). He then held
up the patched-up photo, to the audience's applause. Id. See also Nadine Brozan, Chronicle, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1992, at B4.
113. For a recent account of new manifestations of an "old bigotry," anti-Catholicism, "be-
fouling American public life," see George Weigel, The New Anti-Catholicism, COMMENTARY,
June 1992, at 25. Among the episodes mentioned by Weigel is the controversy over NEA funding
of an exhibition of paintings about AIDS in which the catalogue of the show described Cardinal
O'Connor as a "fat cannibal" and a "creep in black skirts" and referred to St. Patrick's Cathedral
as "that house of walking swastikas." Id. at 25. The New York Times referred to these characteri-
zations as matters of "critical opinion." Id.
114. Joseph Heller, Letters: Questions on Father Healy and Library Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1989, at A34; Gay Talese, Free Speech Views of New Library Chief Needed, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1989, at A24; Garry Wills, Letters: Library Will Be Safe With Father Healy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989, at A30.
115. For a carefully nuanced study of this phenomenon by renowned scholars using content
analysis of four major media outlets (the New York Times, the Washington Post, Time, and CBS
Evening News) during three five-year periods (1964-1968, 1974-1978, and 1984-1988), see S.
ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1991).
116. Why Do the Heathen Rage?, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 1989, at 7 (editorial). Peter Vier-
eck, a historian and poet at Mount Holyoke College, coined the catchy aphorism alluded to by
The New Republic. Like any good aphorism, this one is reported in several versions: (1) "Catho-
lic-baiting is the anti-Semitism of the liberals." Peter Viereck, Plea by a Protestant: Stop Baiting
Catholics 177 CATHOLIC WORLD 22, 22-24 (1953). (2) "Anti-Catholicism is the anti-Semitism of
the intellectuals." Michael Lind, Archer in the Marrow: the Applewood Cycles, NAT'L REV., Feb.
5, 1988, at 55 (reviewing PETER VIERECK, ARCHER IN THE MARROW: THE APPLEWOOD CYCLES
OF 1967-1987 (1987)); see also James L. Buckley, The Catholic Public Servant, FIRST THINGS,
Feb. 1992, at 18, 21. (3) "Anti-Catholicism is the anti-Semitism of the liberals." Why Do the
Heathen Rage?, supra, at 7. See also PETER VIERECK, CONSERVATISM REVISITED AND THE NEW
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Another recent example of hostility to Roman Catholicism is the
recurrent sniping in the media about the position of this church on
abortion. Whatever one thinks about abortion, it is one of the most
vexing problems of our day. Hence one might expect that the media
would accordingly foster intelligent discussion of a variety of per-
spectives about this matter of urgent public concern.' 17 Instead,
there are repeated instances of editorials that mischaracterize the
debate itself as though it were simply a sectarian issue or that treat
with a condescending attitude those Roman Catholics leaders who
have raised their voices on this matter. For example, since becoming
the Archbishop of New York in 1984, Cardinal John O'Connor has
been a vocal critic of the country's complacency with a policy of
abortion on demand, a policy that places virtually no significant re-
strictions on the choice to terminate a pregnancy." 8 For his troubles
O'Connor has encountered the stiff opposition of one of the nation's
CONSERVATISM: WHAT WENT WRONG? 173 (rev. ed. 1962) (noting the pairing of anti-Semitism
and anti-Christianity in both brands of totalitarianism, Hitlerism and Stalinism).
117. As The Williamsburg Charter states:
The role of religion in American public life is too often devalued or dismissed in
public debate, as though the American people's historically vital religious traditions.
were at best a purely private matter and at worst essentially sectarian and divisive.
Such a position betrays a failure of civil respect for the convictions of others. It also
underestimates the degree to which the Framers relied on the American people's reli-
gious convictions to be what Tocqueville described as "the first of their political insti-
tutions." In America, this crucial public role has been played by diverse beliefs, not so
much despite disestablishment as because of disestablishment.
THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER, supra note 33, at 12.
118. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Supreme Court recently
clarified that abortion policy is still governed by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972). Roe appears
to allow the government to regulate abortion after viability, presumably because of the legitimate
interest in protecting life that can survive outside of a mother's womb. What is often overlooked in
the analysis of our current abortion policy, however, is that in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1972),
the companion case to Roe, the Court allowed all abortions thought necessary for the "health [of
the mother]," a term the Court construed to mean "all factors - physical, emotional, psychologi-
cal, familial, and the woman's age." Doe, 410 U.S. at 192; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 467 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,'404 (1981);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 442 (1977). As Justice
White noted in his dissent in Roe twenty years ago, the effect of Roe and Doe taken together is
judicial support for a policy of abortion on demand at all stages of a pregnancy, with no regard for
the protection of fetal life even after viability. Roe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting). Al-
though the Casey opinion could be read as sustaining Roe, it has engendered powerful opposition
among the most vocal supporters of abortion on demand precisely because the three Justices
(O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) who issued a separate opinion in Casey are not convinced that
the government may never impose any reasonable regulation on the termination of a pregnancy.
Time will tell whether the "undue burden" formula which they proposed in Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring), will prove workable.
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leading newspapers, the New York Times.1 9 That is, of course, to
be expected in a republic where freedom of expression is cherished,
and where clerics are emphatically not immune from criticism any
more than their secular counterparts. In my view, though, the tone
of several editorials and op-ed pieces in the Times comes awfully
close to the attitude of hostility that I have been trying to illustrate
in this Essay. It is illuminating, moreover, that one of the leading
editors of the Times took the occasion to inform O'Connor shortly
after he came to New York that when John F. Kennedy was elected
president, "we thought that Catholics understood how things are
done, but frankly, Archbishop, since you came to town, we're not
sure that you understand how we do things here." 20
Several editorials in the Times have since illustrated the crass
"we-they" allocation of who knows what. For example, the Times
editorialized that if Roman Catholic bishops took pastoral steps to
enforce their teaching on abortion, it would tear apart the "truce of
toleration" and the "climate of comity between state and church"
that the Times thinks has existed for two centuries in this country.
Although acknowledging that "churches are free to practice their
faith and to express themselves on politics" and that a "church's
right to discipline its flock is part of American liberty," the Times
suggested that voters would no longer be able to believe the promise
that John Kennedy made to the Protestant clergy in Houston in
1960: "I do not speak for the church and the church does not speak
for me."'1 2' On the contrary, wrote the Times:
[Miany non-Catholic Americans may once again be moved to withhold their
trust from Catholic candidates who could no longer credibly promise to fol-
low the Kennedy and Cuomo examples. Forced obedience to a religious po-
litical agenda could thus prove costly to all: to Catholics who wish to bring
their moral outlook to bear on many more subjects than abortion, and to
non-Catholics, who benefit when politics is enriched by many viewpoints.
Above all, to force religious discipline on public officials risks destroying
the fragile accommodations that Americans of all faiths and no faith have
119. See, e.g., Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., O'Connor, Vaughan, Cuomo, Al Smith, J.F.K., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at A31; Letters to the Editor, Feb. 17, 1990, at A26. For a description of
O'Connor by one of the reporters at the New York Times who has covered him, see ARI L.
GOLDMAN, THE SEARCH FOR GOD AT HARVARD 119-27 (1990).
120. Conversation with Cardinal John O'Connor, October, 1984.
121. The Bishop and the Truce of Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, at D12 (editorial)
(quoting Kennedy's speech, which was reprinted in its entirety, along with a transcript of the
questions and answers that followed, in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1960, at A22). The speech is also
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE BURDEN OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
190-92 (John Frederick Wilson & Donald L. Drakemen eds., 1987).
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built with the bricks of the Constitution and the mortar of tolerance.""2
In 1990, Cardinal O'Connor and one of his Auxiliary Bishops,
Reverend Austin Vaughan, were openly critical of the public record
of Governor Mario Cuomo on the abortion issue. Were these leaders
exercising the normal attributes of citizens in a free and open de-
mocracy? Not according to the distinguished historian, Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., who wrote in the op-ed page of the New York
Times that:
[O'Connor and Vaughan were] doing their best to verify the fears long cher-
ished by the No-Nothings [sic] in the 1850s, the Ku Klux Klan in the
1920s, and a succession of anti-Catholic demagogues that the Roman Cath-
olic Church would try to overrule the American democratic process.
They seem to be doing their best to prove the case that Catholic politi-
cians will not be free to act for what a majority regards as the general
good. 
s
Perhaps this comment does not qualify Professor Schlesinger for
membership in the club of anti-Catholic demagogues of which he
speaks, but it is evident that Jr. was oblivious to the observation of
his father, Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., to Monsignor John Tracy Ellis,
the dean of American Catholic Church historians: "I regard the
prejudice against your Church as the deepest bias in the history of
the American people. 124
My effort here is not to indulge in media-bashing. To underscore
that point, let me offer two examples where major newspapers de-
fended the Catholic Church against its critics when they have gone
beyond the bounds of decency and civility. My first example is the
treatment of the brutal intrusion into the sacred rites of the Church
that occurred when Act Up, a gay rights organization, passed out
condoms at St. Patrick's Cathedral while Cardinal O'Connor was
distributing the bread of the Eucharist to communicants at a Sun-
day Mass on December 10, 1989. The New York Times not only
reported the episode,' 25 it also editorialized against the form of this
protest:
There is plenty of room for controversy over church positions on homosexu-
122. The Bishop and the Truce of Tolerance, supra note 121, at D12. For a discussion of the
attitude at the Times about liberation theology, see Richard John Neuhaus, A Question of Simple
Honesty, NAT'L REV., May 23, 1986, at 37.
123. Schlesinger, supra note 119, at A31.
124. ELLIS, supra note 83, at 151.
125. See Jason DeParle, I11 Held in St. Patrick's AIDS Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989,
at B3.
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ality, AIDS and abortion. No one can quarrel with a peaceful demonstration
outside St. Patrick's, and John Cardinal O'Connor did not do so. . . . But
some of the demonstrators turned honorable dissent into dishonorable dis-
ruption. . . .Far from inspiring sympathy, such a violation mainly offers
another reason to reject both the offensive protesters and their ideas."26
The Times did well to editorialize against the Act Up tantrum.
Like most angry messages, the message of this group was polyva-
lent. At one level it bespoke rage at the pain of exclusion suffered by
gays and lesbians because of their sexual orientation. It was also
intended to be an urgent statement that condoms should be part of a
public health policy to combat the spread of the dread disease of
AIDS. Whatever the message, however, it could have been commu-
nicated less intrusively through leafletting on the public sidewalk
outside the cathedral. In fact, that form of communication may
have enhanced the probability of greater respect for the message by
the listeners. But to enter the sacred space of a church in order to
desecrate it by a parody of Holy Communion does not just go be-
yond the limits of protected free speech activity and invite consider-
ations of trespass. It goes far beyond the bounds of decency, and it
tears apart the common fabric of respect for religious liberty that
should cover the relationships even among people who contend with
one another on public policy matters, whether on religious or secular
grounds.
Hardly anyone holds the absolutist view that freedom of speech
has no limits whatever. For example, reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of communication are generally thought
acceptable. 127 Thus, protesters can be arrested for invading the "sa-
cred" precincts of a court. 2 For that matter, the sacrosanct edito-
rial offices of a newspaper cannot be breached to require the paper
126. The Storming of St. Pat's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1989, at A24 (editorial). Nearly two
years later the same group tried to bring its message to a national television audience through a
documentary entitled Stop the Church. PBS declined to support national distribution of the film
because of what it called a "pervasive tone of ridicule." Peter Steinfels, Channel 13 to Show Film
on AIDS Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at A24. Walter Goodman, the TV critic for the
New York Times, wrote that the film was a "nonstop diatribe against the Roman Catholic Church
and John Cardinal O'Connor." Walter Goodman, Prime Time Vs. Art of Ridicule, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1991, § 2, at 21.
127. See. e.g., TRIBE, supra note 46, at 789-94.
128. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (allowing a peaceful demonstration on
the sidewalk adjacent to the Supreme Court, but not allowing demonstration inside the building).
Not even the First Amendment absolutist, Justice Hugo Black, thought much of the rights of civil
rights demonstrators who took their protest too close for his Southern comfort to a courthouse.
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581-84 (1965).
[Vol. 42:263
HOSTILITY TO RELIGION
to offer space to a political enemy, even though that would expand
the viewpoints expressed on matters of public concern.12 9
And more than a trespass against property rights was implicated
in the Act Up episode at St. Patrick's Cathedral. No one would miss
this something extra if neo-Nazis had desecrated a Jewish cemetery
by painting swastikas or other contemptuous symbols on the stones
marking the last resting place of Holocaust survivors. By the same
token, the ability of all people to worship free from disruption is one
worthy of protection as a free exercise principle.
Another example of media opposition to anti-Catholic bias oc-
curred a year later. In 1991, shortly after President Bush announced
his controversial nomination of Clarence Thomas to serve as an As-
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court, Governor Douglas Wilder of
Virginia told reporters that since Thomas had been schooled by
nuns, the confirmation process should focus on the question, "How
much allegiance is there to the Pope?"1 '' The Governor apologized
later "if anyone was offended" - and plenty were - by his remark
about the Catholic background of Judge Thomas.' For the record,
it might be noted that Justice Thomas is now an Episcopalian.
If Bush had nominated a prominent Jew to be our ambassador to
the United Nations and if Wilder had publicly questioned the fitness
of this nominee to serve, on the view that Jews owe allegiance to
Israel, 32 newspapers from coast to coast would have rightly de-
manded Wilder's immediate withdrawal from the presidential race,
if not his resignation from public office, for making a disgraceful
anti-Semitic remark. Not many papers objected to Wilder's com-
ment about Thomas, but the Washington Post editorialized against
the Governor's ignorance of the No Religious Test provision of the
129. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating under the
Free Press Clause a statute that granted a political candidate a right to equal space in a newspa-
per to reply to criticism and attacks on his record).
130. David S. Broder, Wilder Urges Scrutiny Of Thomas on Abortion; Religion Impels Ques-
tioning, Governor Says, WASH. POST, July 3, 1991, at A14; Richard L. Berke, Judge Thomas
Faces Bruising Battle With Liberals Over Stand on Rights, N.Y. TiMEs, July 4, 1991, at A12.
131. Donald P. Baker & David S. Broder, Wilder in Hot Water; Prelates, Politicians Angered
by Words On High Court Nominee's Catholicism, WASH. POST, July 4, 1991, at Cl; B. Drum-
mond Ayres, Virginia Leader Apologizes for Remark on Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1991, at
A6. For a thoughtful reflection both on the limits of federal judicial power and on the ways in
which religious convictions might properly influence the process of judging, see Buckley, supra
note 116, at 18.
132. I note in passing that Arthur Goldberg served with great distinction as our Ambassador to
the United Nations during the troubled times of the hostilities of 1967.
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Constitution.138 According to Al Smith, who was himself a target of
religious bigotry when he ran for president as a Democrat in 1928,
this provision "represents the most vital principle that was ever
given to a people."'" 4
133. Specifically, the Washington Post stated:
[lI]t is important to understand exactly what was wrong about [Governor Wilder's]
remarks. It is the implication that American Catholics, unlike religious people of
other persuasions, are some kind of public-policy robots marching in lock-step to the
commands of a foreign leader. Setting aside the records of some of the more illustri-
ous Catholics who have held high office in this country - men and women such as
John F. Kennedy, William Brennan and assorted members of Congress as dissimilar
as Barbara Mikulski and Henry Hyde - the governor raises the old bugaboo that
Rome controls them all.
Senators need not concern themselves about matters of theology, dogma or papal
pronouncements. Their responsibility is to assess the nominee's own views concerning
legal, not religious, matters. Discuss, if they will, his thoughts on the right to privacy,
the constitutional argument over prayer at public ceremonies and the authority of
Congress to authorize chaplains in the military. So long as senators are not seeking a
pledge about cases that may come before the court, such general questions touching
on law and religion can be asked of any nominee.
In the Pocket of the Pope?, WASH. POST, July 6, 1991, at AI8 (editorial).
134. This quotation is from a letter from Al Smith to the author's grandfather, John Peter
Gaffney, dated July 2, 1928. In the previous year, a New York lawyer openly questioned whether
Al Smith or any other Roman Catholic was fit to serve as president on the ground that the loyalty
of American Catholics as well as their devotion to the Constitution are suspect. Charles C. Smith,
An Open Letter to the Honorable Alfred E. Smith: A Question That Needs an Answer, 139 THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 540 (1927). Smith, who had served four terms as Governor of New York,
published a spirited reply in the next issue of the journal. Alfred E. Smith, Catholic and Patriot:
Governor Smith Replies, 139 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 721 (1927). Smith concluded his reply
with a summary of his creed as an American Catholic:
I believe in absolute freedom of conscience for all men and in equality of all churches,
all sects, and all beliefs before the law as a matter of right and not as a matter of
favor . . . . And I believe in the common brotherhood of men under the common
fatherhood of God. In this spirit I join with fellow Americans of all creeds in a fervent
prayer that never again in this land will any public servant be challenged because of
the faith in which he has tried to walk humbly with his God.
Id. at 728. This essay is reprinted in ALFRED E. SMITH. PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (1928) and in
14 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 536 (1968). The attack on Smith's religion in the campaign of 1928
by the Ku Klux Klan and other bigots is discussed in MYERS, supra note 49, at 258. Smith lost
the election of 1928, of course, and he did not get his wish that public servants would never again
be challenged because of their religious faith. For example, after World War II, one of the leading
figures in the organization, known as Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, wrote a frequently cited attack on the growing influence of American Catholics
in public life. PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949). For a reply
to Blanshard's volume, see JAMES M. O'NEILL, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (1952).
In 1960, a leading Episcopal Bishop who had been a law professor before his ordination ac-
knowledged that the constitutional prohibition on religious tests meant that "No voter should vote
against any candidate simply on the ground of his religion." JAMES A. PIKE, A ROMAN CATHOLIC
IN THE WHITE HOUSE 130 (1960). Bishop Pike, however, added that the tradition of equality for
all faiths is so "well established" among Protestants, Jews, and secularists that no question need
be raised of them, but that this issue becomes "complicated only in the case of a Roman Catholic
candidate." Id. at 131. Pike also raised "the question of assessing to what degree a Roman Catho-
HOSTILITY TO RELIGION
The sad examples of coercion in matters of religious commitment
and hostility to members of religious minorities that I have re-
counted here strike at the very core of religious freedom. Because
these attitudes persist, even in subtle manifestations, they merit firm
censure, not collective amnesia. 35 The seamy side of American his-
tory - our violent outbursts of hatred toward religious minorities
- turns out to be important in understanding the official hostility
towards religion that Justice Goldberg warned of in School District
v. Schempp.136
II. OFFICIAL HOSTILITY TO RELIGION
The second confusion of which The Williamsburg Charter spoke
was official governmental hostility toward religion. Though less dra-
matic than overt hostility, complete indifference to religion on the
part of government is just as lethal to religious freedom, especially
in the affirmative welfare state. To state it more precisely, mere for-
mal neutrality toward religion turns out to be another form of hos-
tility.'3 7 To quote The Williamsburg Charter again: "[T]he chief
menace to religious liberty today is the expanding power of govern-
ment control over personal behavior and the institutions of society,
when the government acts not so much in deliberate hostility to, but
in reckless disregard of, communal belief and personal
conscience.' 3 8
A watershed in official hostility or indifference to religion was
reached when the Supreme Court dramatically reduced the protec-
lic President would be subject to various types of informal ecclesiastical pressures, and the degree
to which a Roman Catholic President would really be able to enter into the occasions reflecting
our pluralistic society .... " Id. at 132. With friends like Pike, John Fitzgerald Kennedy could
have used a few enemies. He addressed the "religious issue" both in the West Virginia primary,
and in a famous statement to Baptist clergy in Dallas, where he promised to resign the presidency
"if the time should ever come . . . when my office would require me to either violate my con-
science, or violate the national interest . . . . [If this election is decided on the basis that
40,000,000 Americans lost their chance of being President on the day they were baptized, then it
is the whole nation that will be the losers in the eyes of the Catholics and non-Catholics through-
out the world, in the eyes of history, and in the eyes of our own people." Kennedy's statement,
along with the questions and answers that followed, were published in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1960,
at A22.
135. See KEVIN R. LONG, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN THE 1980'S (1988); MICHAEL SCHWARTZ,
THE PERSISTENT PREJUDICE: ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA (1984).
136. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
137. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Reli-
gion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
138. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER, supra note 33, at 9.
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tion of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v.
Smith."3 9 Several commentators have noted egregious flaws in the
Court's opinion."4 0 I will not repeat their criticisms here but will
confine my comment to the way in which Smith acted "not so much
in deliberate hostility to, but in reckless disregard of, communal be-
lief and personal conscience."'" Justice Scalia, the author of Smith,
is well aware of the danger to liberty posed by omnipresent regula-
tion in the modern welfare state. Indeed, he was the darling of de-
regulation when he was a scholar in residence at the American En-
terprise Institute. He knows from the inside the intricacies of
modern administrative law, which he taught as a professor of law at
the University of Chicago. For this very reason it is astonishing that
he would be so impervious to the danger to religious liberty posed by
the demands of the modern natiori-state. Government at all levels is
now far more intrusive than it was at the time of the founding. As
Donald Giannella noted with considerable understatement, "The
style and scope of twentieth century government has led to its in-
volvement with ends and values of varying importance."' 42 In the
days of the watchman state, there was little need for religious ex-
emption; in the days of the regulatory state, there is every need. To
regulate religion on the same basis as other activities is to brook
deep and constant intermeddling by the state in matters of religion.
Under the doctrine that held sway beforeSmith, the Free Exer-
cise Clause required that the government not enforce a law or policy
that burdened the exercise of a sincere religious belief unless it was
the least restrictive means of attaining a particularly important sec-
ular objective." ' Even under the "compelling interest" test, how-
ever, government lawyers were not having a very hard time persuad-
139. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
140. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91
(1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
For a defense of the Smith decision, see William P. Marshall, Correspondence: Exchange on the
First Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 118, 122 (1990) and Ellis West, The Case Against a Right
to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
141. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER, supra note 33, at 9.
142. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part 1. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (1967); see also McCon-
nell, supra note 64, at 23 (arguing for greater vigilance against encroachment of liberty when
government programs are more encompassing).
143. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ing courts that their little slice of the bureaucracy was vital to the
survival of the Republic. Michael McConnell has deftly summarized
the holdings of the major free exercise decisions of the 1970s and
1980s:
Orthodox Jews have been expelled from the military for wearing yarmulkes;
a religious community in which all members worked for the church and be-
lieved that acceptance of wages would be an affront to God has been forced
to yield to the minimum wage; religious colleges have been denied tax ex-
emptions for enforcing what they regard to be religiously compelled moral
regulations; Amish farmers who refuse Social Security benefits have been
forced to pay Social Security taxes; and Muslim prisoners have been denied
the right to challenge prison regulations that conflict with their worship
schedule.'
After Smith, government lawyers do not even have to bother
showing up in court with any kind of a serious reason for overriding
a religious claim pressed against a facially neutral governmental de-
mand. Lower court cases since Smith demonstrate that local govern-
ments often have little or no respect for sincere religious convictions
at odds with the sensibilities or preferences of the majority, and that
an antidiscrimination principle is not sufficient to shield the exercise
of religion from the intolerance of majorities and the inflexibility of
bureaucrats. Let me offer a few examples of cases that should not
have passed the straight face test, let alone any kind of rigorous test
that required a showing of a serious governmental interest overrid-
ing a claim of exemption from a generally applicable norm.
In St. Agnes Hospital v. Riddick,'45 a district court found a com-
pelling interest in requiring a religious hospital to teach all residents
how to perform abortions, irrespective of whether this governmental
mandate would create a crisis of conscience either for the hospital or
for at least some of its personnel.' 6 The lower court was apparently
unaware of the Supreme Court's diminution of the compelling inter-
est requirement in Smith. What is most striking about the case is
that even on a belief so deeply and widely held as conscientious ob-
jection to performing abortions, state officials ignored the Court's
suggestions that "it is desirable" for the political branches to pro-
vide free exercise exemptions. 4 7
144. Michael W. McConnell, Why "Separation" Is Not the Key to Church-State Relations,
107 CHRISTIAN CENT. 43, 46 (1989).
145. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990).
146. Id. at 329.
147. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184-205 (1973) (upholding a conscience clause protect-
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In a little publicized case, the city of New York recently invoked
handicap access regulations to close down a shelter for the homeless
operated by Mother Teresa's religious order, the Missionaries of
Charity. 48 The shelter was on the second floor of a walk-up. The
nuns offered to carry any handicapped they encountered upstairs,
but the City would brook no exception to its neutral, generally en-
forceable rules requiring an elevator in a homeless shelter. 49 The
City should have taken the prize for the most frivolous governmen-
tal interest ever asserted against a religious body engaged in chari-
table activity - the view that it is better for the homeless to sleep
in the street than in a building without an elevator. Under Smith
analysis, the State did not need any reason; even a frivolous "gener-
ally applicable" rule was enough to shut down a religious mission.
The bureaucracy won, while the nuns and the homeless lost.
In Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 5 a generally applicable,
facially neutral law requiring autopsies was applied to a Conserva-
tive Jew who had died in an auto accident.' 5' Under Jewish law, the
defilement of the body is a sacrilege, and burial must take place at
least before sundown on the day after the death. 52 Since the man
had died in an auto accident, that should have satisfied whatever
interest the government might have in ascertaining the cause of
death of its citizens. Similarly, in You Vang Yang v. Sturner, 58 a
district court, "with great regret" dismissed on the basis of Smith
its earlier determination that the government was required to ac-
commodate the religious objection of Vietnamese Hmong to autop-
sies on the ground that the body of the deceased must be revered
without mutilation. 4 The governmental interest in an autopsy in
this case was slight; Mr. Yang had died in his sleep without any
suggestion of foul play, consumption of unlawful drugs, or any evi-
dence relating to a matter of public health. 55 In both cases, a
mechanical approach to "generally applicable" norms was allowed
to trump a sincerely held religious tenet, in a manner that was man-
ing doctors and nurses who refuse to participate in abortions).
148. See Sam Roberts, Fight City Hall? Nope, Not Even Mother Teresa, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1990, at BI.
149. Id.
150. 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
151. Id. at 1257-58.
152. Id. at 1258.
153. 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
154. Id.
155. 728 F. Supp 845, 846, opinion withdrawn by 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
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ifestly not the least restrictive alternative means of effectuating the
government's interests.
After becoming aware that they no longer have a constitutional
obligation to accommodate minority religious convictions, govern-
mental agencies have typically pursued the bureaucratic imperative
without regard to contrary religious interests, belying the promise in
Smith that the political branches of government can safely be
trusted to respect the value of protecting the first of our civil liber-
ties.156 Even a well-intentioned legislature may frequently be una-
ware of the impact of its laws on unfamiliar faiths, and the press of
business in the legislatures makes particularized legislative remedies
at best an uncertain source of protection.
At the local level, zoning laws have been invoked both to prohibit
a church from beginning its ministry at all and even to regulate the
number of persons to whom a church may minister.157 Zero-popula-
tion growth may be desirable in a particular local community, but
the application of this policy to a church's spread of the gospel is a
clear example of governmental overreaching.
At the federal level, one agency even construed Smith to allow -
or worse yet, to require - the revocation of a religious exemption
from the requirement of wearing hard hats on construction sites. 158
This administrative decision - temporarily lifted under congres-
sional pressure - exemplifies the bureaucratic impulse to enforce
all laws to the limit of their logic, without regard for their impact on
religious minorities.
This bureaucratic tendency has even led officials in the Justice
Department to extend the reach of Smith to "generally applicable"
norms of oppressive foreign regimes. In its training manual dealing
with asylum for refugees claiming a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service characterizes
Smith as supporting an "[a]lien's obligation to obey general law,
notwithstanding religious objection." '159 The "tempest-tossed yearn-
ing to breathe free" may evidently be denied asylum if a govern-
ment attorney couches potential emigres' experiences of religious
156. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
157. See Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533, (111. App.
Ct. 1990); see also R. Gustav Niebuhr, Here Is The Church, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at Al.
158. OSHA Instruction STD 1-6.3 (Feb 4, 1975), revoked by, OSHA Notice CPL 2 (Nov. 5,
1990), revocation suspended pending administrative review (1991).
159. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., BASIC LAW MANUAL
ASYLUM: A TRAINING MANUAL FOR IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OFFICERS 37 (1991).
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persecution abroad in facially neutral terms. The Supreme Court
surely did not have in mind complicated asylum claims when it de-
cided Smith, but that case is now being invoked to assert the tauto-
logical, statist claim that a foreign government may "seek to punish
conduct it may lawfully forbid."' 160
The problem of official hostility or indifference to religion obvi-
ously antedates Smith. According to Michael McConnell, for exam-
ple, the real problem with the Religion Clause jurisprudence of the
Warren and the Burger Courts was not the inconsistencies that
many have noted,'61 but "the Court's tendency to press relentlessly
in the direction of a more secular society."' 65  For McConnell, to
make the Religion Clause an engine of increased secularization is
the most dangerous form of hostility toward religion in the recent
case law:
The Court's opinions seemed to view religion as an unreasoned, aggressive,
exclusionary, and divisive force that must be confined to the private sphere.
When religions stuck to the private functions of "spiritual comfort, guid-
ance, and inspiration," the Court extended the protection of the Constitu-
tion. But the Court was ever conscious that religion "can also serve
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are not in
accord with particular religions." The Court's more important mission was
to protect democratic society from religion. 163
With his customary acuity, McConnell has located the shift in
Religion Clause jurisprudence in the Rehnquist Court as "part of a
general jurisprudential shift in favor of greater judicial restraint."'"
Though generally in sympathy with this view, McConnell notes:
[Jiudicial restraint, for its own sake, is not a faithful mode of interpreting
the Religion Clauses. There is a crucial difference between the discovery of
"rights" not expressly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, where the
dangers of judicial legislation and the need for judicial restraint are the
160. Id.; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religious Conservatives Misjudged the Court.
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 18, 1991, at 19 (characterizing the Court as statist rather than as
conservative).
161. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 117-20; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-64 (1986); Jesse H. Choper, The Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673 (1980);
Antonin Scalia, On Making It Look Easy by Doing It Wrong. A Critical View of the Justice
Department. in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD, supra note 99, at 173.
162. McConnell, supra note 32, at 120.
163. Id. (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985)); see Laycock,
supra note 137, at 1007-10; see also Richard Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of
Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 19 (1992) (arguing that the Court is not influenced by the priva-
tization hypothesis).
164. McConnell, supra note 32, at 136.
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greatest, and the enforcement of rights firmly based on the text and tradi-
tion of the Constitution. 165
It is entirely possible, then, that we may get from the Rehnquist
Court a more coherent, but far less protective interpretation of the
Religion Clause of the First Amendment, one, in short, that will be
increasingly hostile or indifferent toward religion.
III. HOSTILITY TO RELIGION IN THE TUG-OF-WAR THEORY OF
THE RELIGION CLAUSE
I have suggested in Part I that American history is replete with
examples of subtle as well as overt hostility to religion. I have illus-
trated this theme with respect to two religious communities in
America, Muslims and Roman Catholics, though the illustration
could as easily have been taken from the history of Jews, Mormons,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Fundamentalists, or other religious minorities
in America. In Part II, I have suggested that this culture or history
of hostility or indifference to religion has influenced the course of
the law relating to religious freedom, with the result that in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith166 and its progeny in the lower courts,
the protection of religious freedom has been significantly dimin-
ished. I now wish to suggest that hostility toward religion is at least
implicit in the general misunderstanding about the relationship be-
tween the two provisions of the Religion Clause of the First
Amendment.
The Williamsburg Charter speaks of "the First Amendment Reli-
gious Liberty clauses, whose mutually reinforcing provisions act as a
double guarantee of religious liberty."' 67 Together the two parts of
the Religion Clause form a strong bulwark against suppression of
religious liberty. The prevailing view, however, is that the two provi-
sions are in deep tension with one another, and if carried to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash.'68
This bifurcation of the two parts of the Religion Clause has led to
problems both in theory and practice. An example of the theoretical
confusion is the conflict the Court built into the standards it laid
165. Id; see also McConnell, supra note 140, at 1149 ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause, properly
understood, does not pose the problem of subjective judicial restraint so feared by the majority in
Smith.").
166. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
167. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER, supra note 33, at 6.
168. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
19921
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
down in the Lemon case for determining a violation of the No-Es-
tablishment Clause.169 If taken seriously, these criteria prohibited
what the Free Exercise Clause was thought to require, at least
before the Smith case. And if that result made little sense as a mat-
ter of logic or coherent constitutional theory, the theory became
worse in Smith, where the so-called tension between the clauses was
removed by eliminating the vigor and force of the Free Exercise
Clause. That is like fixing a headache by lopping off the head.
If my metaphor seems excessive, the metaphors the Court has
chosen to describe the relationship between the two parts of the Re-
ligion Clause are not very helpful either. Chief Justice Burger sug-
gested the image of a ship captain struggling to find a "neutral
course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical ex-
treme, would tend to clash with the other. ' 170 Taking this metaphor
to the limit, Chief Justice Rehnquist has described a narrow channel
that the Court must steer between a Scylla and a Charybdis. 17 This
surely qualifies for the New Yorker's "Block that Metaphor" col-
umn. It is especially inappropriate because it implies a negative con-
notation for both parts of the Religion Clause, imagined to be twin
perils or dangers neither of which could be evaded without risking
the other.1 72 It is almost as if James Madison and his colleagues had
planned a big tug-of-war between disharmonious and brutal rivals
by crafting the first two provisions of the First Amendment in a way
that made little sense without the valiant efforts of the Court in the
late twentieth century to "reconcile" the seeming "conflict" between
them.
Fine minds have attempted to find a rational solution to the pur-
ported conflict between the two clauses.1 73 Others, however, have in-
sisted that the very attempt to pit one clause against the other is
itself a subtle manifestation, however unintentional, of hostility to-
ward religion. Michael Paulsen, for example, has powerfully op-
posed a dichotomous view of the two provisions of the Religion
169. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
170. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
171. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Rehn-
quist's Scylla and Charybdis analogy).
172. Scylla was a dangerous rock on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina; Charybdis was a
nearby whirlpool. These perils were represented as female monsters in ancient mythology.
173. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 161.
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Clause implicated in the "grand tug-of-war" metaphor. 17 ' This
view, which posits a schizophrenia within the Religion Clause, is
about as plausible as believing that the Free Press Clause was both
intended to foster greater dissemination of opinions and to repress
any thought the government finds offensive.
Richard John Neuhaus has taken the argument a step further,
suggesting that the current incoherence of Religion Clause jurispru-
dence is a necessary corollary of the commonplace construction of
the Religion Clause of the First Amendment as containing two pro-
visions that are mutually opposed:
The conventional wisdom is that there are two religion clauses that must
somehow be "balanced," one against the other. But these provisions of the
First Amendment are not against each other. Each is in the service of the
other. More precisely, there is one religion clause, not two. The meaning of
a "clause," apart from the narrowly grammatical, is that it is an article or
stipulation. The two-part religion clause of the First Amendment stipulates
that there must be no law respecting an establishment of religion. The rea-
son for this is to avoid any infringement of the free exercise of religion.
Non-establishment is not a good in itself, it does not stand on its own feet.
The positive good is free exercise, to which non-establishment is
instrumental.'7"
Neuhaus is not downplaying either the historical or the contempo-
rary significance of the prohibition against an established religion. I
read him simply to be reminding us, as The Williamsburg Charter
did, that the reason for the prohibition of an established religion -
both at the time of the framing and now - is to promote religious
liberty. Nonestablishment of religion is "instrumental" in this sense,
but the term "instrumental" is not a term of derision; it is language
borrowed from Aristotle to indicate the channel through which the
goal of religious liberty is attained in our society. Perhaps the best
way to correct Neuhaus is not to deny the truth of his point about
instrumentality, but to emphasize in addition that both parts of the
174. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Ap-
proach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 324 n.66 (1986).
175. Richard John Neuhaus, Contending for the Future. Overcoming the Pfefferian Inversion,
8 J.L. & RELIGION 115, 115-116 (1990) [hereinafter Neuhaus, Contending for the Future]; see
also Mary Ann Glendon & Paul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MicH. L. REV. 477
(1991) (treating both provisions of the Religion Clause holistically as ways of serving religious
liberty and arguing that this approach would eliminate artificial distinctions between establish-
ment and free exercise); Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 620, 627 (1992) ("[T]here is no conflict, no tension, no required 'balancing' be-
tween free exercise and establishment. There are not two religion clauses. There is but one Reli-
gion Clause.").
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Religion Clause are interrelated terminal values.
Thus, Neuhaus is correct when he argues against the treatment of
the no-establishment value in isolation. The consequence of this iso-
lation, he suggests, is that:
In decision after decision, non-establishment has been given practical prior-
ity, with the topsy-turvy result that the end (free exercise of religion) has
been subordinated to the means (non-establishment of religion). In legal
thinking this has gone so far that Laurence Tribe can write in his much
respected treatise on constitutional law that there is a "zone which the free
exercise clause carves out of the establishment clause for permissible accom-
modation of religious interests. This carved-out area might be characterized
as the zone of permissible accommodation." There we have the inversion
perfectly and succinctly stated. Professor Tribe allows that, within carefully
prescribed limits, the means (non-establishment) might permissibly accom-
modate the end (free exercise). This way of thinking is hardly original with
Professor Tribe. Indeed it is entrenched in the conventional wisdom and in
court decisions of the last several decades. Nonetheless, had we not been
habituated to it, such an inverted construction of the religion clause would
be greeted with astonished incredulity.1
76
It is not my view that Neuhaus's nemesis, Leo Pfeffer, the most
prominent advocate of an absolute separationist perspective on the
Establishment Clause, is in any real sense hostile to religion. On the
contrary, Pfeffer is a devout Jew who is convinced that religion will
thrive - even that it can only thrive - when it does not enjoy the
benefit of governmental subsidies. 1 7 In fairness to Pfeffer, moreover,
it should be noted that he welcomed the Supreme Court's decision
in Wisconsin v. Yoder17 8 in an article entitled The Supremacy of
Free Exercise.1 79 And Leo Pfeffer joined his old adversary on Estab-
lishment Clause matters, William Bentley Ball, in roundly excoriat-
ing the Court for its decision in the Smith case. 80 Perhaps all that
can be said, then, is that the Supreme Court's continued focus on
the Establishment Clause, successfully led by Pfeffer,""1 had
176. Neuhaus, Contending for the Future, supra note 175, at 116-17 (quoting LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 823 (1978)). In the second edition of his treatise, Pro-
fessor Tribe expressly states that "different results are arguably mandated by the two religion
clauses" and purports to offer help to "identify the zone in which the free exercise clause domi-
nates the intersection, permitting the accommodation of religious interests." TRIBE, supra note 46,
at 1169.
177. See Leo Pfeffer, An Autobiographical Sketch, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 487-533 (James E. Wood ed., 1985).
178. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
179. Leo Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEo. LJ. 1115 (1973).
180. See Petition for Rehearing, Employment Div. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
181. Samuel Krislov, Alternatives to Separation of Church and State in Countries Outside the
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brought us to a state of the law in which the free exercise of religion
has - to say the very least of Smith and its progeny - become
undervalued and underprotected by the judiciary. Long before Neu-
haus and others began writing about the First Amendment in this
vein, moreover, Professor Paul Kauper had argued that "[a]ny in-
terpretation of [the Establishment Clause] and the constitutional
values it serves must also take into account the free exercise clause
and the values it serves." '182
CONCLUSION: ON SAYING NO TO CAESAR
I conclude not with a grand theory, but with an autobiographical
note. Many of my fellow religious believers and I take our spiritual
nurture from peacemakers like Francis of Assisi, Teresa of Calcutta,
and Dorothy Day of the Bowery. In this respect, we are like the
Mennonites, who took a radical stand in opposition to violence at
the time of the Reformation, and who believe that being in trouble
with the State is one of the marks or sure signs of the church's
authenticity.183
Although I take my stand generally against the necessity of vio-
lence to resolve disputes, this conviction does not make me an easy
mark for confusing the two orders or realms of church and state, or
for collapsing the one into the other. In fact, it is precisely because I
prize the freedom of the church to announce the Gospel that I must
of necessity place some limits on the power of the government to lay
its general commands upon all.
For these reasons, I come in the end to a conclusion that some
might find paradoxical. As a religious believer knowing well the dif-
ference between the commands of God and those of human powers,
I expect all governments - ours included - to be hostile at some
point to the demands of biblical religion. Yet as a civil libertarian in
the Madisonian tradition, I am deeply opposed to the government's
indifference and hostility to religion and to religious freedom, for
this hostility to the first and most fragile of our civil liberties is dan-
gerous to the whole structure of all of our civil liberties.
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To conclude in the words of The Williamsburg Charter.
The right to freedom of conscience . . . is the foundation of, and is inte-
grally related to, all other rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution.
Religious liberty finally depends on neither the favors of the state and its
officials nor the vagaries of tyrants or majorities. Religious liberty in a de-
mocracy is a right that may not be submitted to vote and depends on the
outcome of no election. A society is only as just and free as it is respectful of
this right, especially toward the beliefs of its smallest minorities and least
popular communities."'
184. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER, supra note 33, at 8.
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